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When people speak about Alasdair MacIntyre, they generally begin by talking
about After Virtue, a book he first published in 1981 that has been spurring debates in
contemporary ethics, politics, management, social theory, the philosophy of the social
sciences, and the history of philosophy for more than a quarter century now. Speakers
begin by talking about After Virtue because, too often, that is the only text by Alasdair
MacIntyre that they have ever read. Unfortunately, this is as reasonable as it is
lamentable, for the justifications for having read only After Virtue follow the divisions of
the contemporary academy. After Virtue is an important book that draws from, and
contributes to, many different academic specializations, thus it has commanded a reading
from many people that his other works have not. After Virtue also stands at a turning
point in MacIntyre’s career; it is his last fully secular book, and introduces his movement
toward traditional Christian thought, thus, for some, it marks the end of his works worth
reading, while for others it marks the beginning. So a word of introduction is warranted
here, not only for students who have never read Alasdair MacIntyre at all, but also for
Christian readers unfamiliar with MacIntyre’s early work, secular readers who have not
taken up his later work, and specialists who have never had an opportunity to consider the
larger picture of MacIntyre’s philosophy.
Introduction to MacIntyre
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Alasdair MacIntyre was born in Great Britain in 1929 and grew up mainly in
London. Both of his parents were medical doctors.1 He attended Queen Mary College of
the University of London from 1945 to 1949, graduating with “an honours BA in
Classics.”MacIntyre went on to graduate school at the University of Manchester where he
earnedhis MA in philosophy in 1951.2 It was not yet customary for British humanities
professors to earn PhDs, so this was MacIntyre’s terminal degree.
From the very beginning of his career, Alasdair MacIntyre has been interested in
ethics and politics as an interconnected whole. Where some scholars would present
ethics as a study of personal obligations and politics as a study of forms of government,
MacIntyre has always seen ethics as a study of the requirements of human relationships
and politics as a study of the structures that support or hinder those relationships. We
find this in his MA thesis, practically reproduced in paraphrase in Thomas D’Andrea’s,
Tradition, Rationality, and Virtue, we also find it in MacIntyre’s first published book,
Marxism: An Interpretation,3 and in many of his essays from the 1950s and 1960s,
including “What Morality is Not,”4 “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought,’”5 “Freedom and
Revolution,”6 and “Breaking the Chains of Reason.”7
One of the major influences on MacIntyre’s early work on ethics and politics was
Marxism, which MacIntyre viewed as an indispensable foundation for any truly
democratic society, and since we are more accustomed today to think of Marxism as the
D’Andrea, xvi.
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antithesis of democracy, it is worth taking a moment to consider why MacIntyre would
have viewed Marxism in this way.
Marxism arose in response to the industrial revolution, the period when
communities united around centuries old craft traditions were made to compete against
machines operated by relatively unskilled workers that could produce high quality goods
with a speed and consistency that had never been known before. Wherever these
competitions took place, the craft communities were overcome by the efficiency of the
factories. This meant that independent craft workers, who had owned their own tools and
participated freely in the lives of their communities were forced to become employees in
the mills, using tools that belonged to someone else, accepting a wage based not on the
value of the goods they produced but on the market for the work they was willing to do.
Labor itself had become a commodity. The transformation from skilled crafts to
industrial production meant two things: First, no craft worker could ever afford the tools
required to operate a factory; the means of production belonged instead to the capitalists
who owned the factory. Second, since the machinery could be operated by relatively
unskilled workers, the workers became increasingly dependent upon the factory, since
their employment robbed them of the time to develop any other marketable talent, even
as industrialization dried up the markets for any goods they might produce on their own.8
Karl Marx viewed the industrial revolution in two ways: as a crisis and as an
opportunity. On one hand, maltreatment of industrial workers and the breakdown of
traditional communities constituted a crisis of human relationships. On the other hand,
the remarkable productivity of modern industry provided an opportunity for revolutionary
See Karl Marx, “Machinery and Modern Industry,” in Capital: A Critique of Political Economy,
pp. 405-556.
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change. For Marx believed that if the people were to unite and take ownership of the
means of production, they could establish a utopian democratic world, in which everyone
contributed to their communities according to their abilities and received according to
their needs. Summarizing the goals of the revolution in the Communist Manifesto, Marx
and Engels concluded:
In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we
shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition
for the free development of all.9
This was the vision of the future that animated Lenin and Trotsky in Russia’s October
Revolution of 1917, and it was the same vision that animated MacIntyre’s early Marxist
work. In 1960, MacIntyre rejected the notion “that socialism and democracy can be
separated,10 and argued that “the achievement of freedom and the achievement of the
classless society are inseparably united.”11
To say that Karl Marx viewed the industrial revolution as a crisis and as an
opportunity is to say that Marxism has two distinct parts: first, it offers a critique of
capitalist economic and political practices; second, it proposes a revolutionary alternative
to capitalism. MacIntyre left the Marxist movement behind after he lost faith in its
revolutionary solution, but the Marxist critique of capitalism remains a key resource for
MacIntyre and an important theme in his mature work.12
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MacIntyre’s career has been marked by two seemingly contrary traits: constancy
and change; we will consider his changes first.
As a young academic, MacIntyre was both a Marxist and a member of the Church
of England, his first book tried to show that Marxism and Christianity were not so
opposed as they were generally taken to be, and that Marxists and Christians could learn
from one another. By the early 1960s, he had lost his Christian faith, and had become a
committed atheist; while he studied and published on Hume. MacIntyre’s achievements
in the 1960s included a pair of lectures delivered at Columbia University in New York
City on “the Religious Significance of Atheism,” and a new book, A Short History of
Ethics. In the early 1970s MacIntyre finally broke off his affiliations with Marxists
organizations and turned his attention to Aristotle. In 1977, MacIntyre published the
essay “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science,”
which marked a turning point in his work, which led to the publication of his landmark
work, After Virtue in 1981. Around this time he also returned to Christianity, first to the
Anglican church, and then to the Roman Catholic Church. In 1988, MacIntyre published
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, which took up some questions about the nature of
rationality raised by After Virtue, and defended, for the first time, the thought of Thomas
Aquinas and the adherents of the Thomistic tradition. Since then, MacIntyre has
published three more new books, along with two volumes of essays selected from the
hundreds of articles and reviews MacIntyre has published. So it is with good reason that
commentators often remark that MacIntyre’s career has been marked by change.
It is also true that MacIntyre’s career has been marked by a virtue he calls
constancy. Those who have read MacIntyre’s work from all parts of his career know
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very well that the main themes and concerns of his ethical and political work have
remained the same for more than fifty years. Through his entire career, MacIntyre has
written about the role of communities in establishing the goods pursued by their
members, and the ethics of participating in the community’s pursuit of the good, which
includes an account of the discipline required to support the members’ free participation
in that work. This is MacIntyre’s ethics and politics of practice.
Alasdair MacIntyre’s Ethics and Politics of Practice
The most important text for understanding MacIntyre’s ethics and politics of
practice is After Virtue, but two other short works help to clarify MacIntyre’s project.
The first is “Notes from the Moral Wilderness,” a pair of essays published in 1958 and
1959. The second is “The Theses on Feuerbach: A Road Not Taken,” published in 1994.
MacIntyre’s account of practice is important because it provides a foundation for ethics
and politics that appeals to human desire and human reason, and at the same time
confirms the best critiques of alternative approaches.
There are generally two conventional theories of ethics in contemporary moral
philosophy. The first is an ethics of duty, the second it an ethics of utility. According to
the ethics of duty, normal adults are able to recognize that they have certain duties, and
morality is about upholding these duties. These duties are unrelated to anything that the
agent wants or needs, in fact, these duties are often contrary to human desire. This is the
position of Immanuel Kant, who taught that our actions have true moral worth only when
we do them out of respect for duty alone. How then am I to know my duties?
A fair assessment of Kant’s position seems to entail that one knows one’s duties
through one’s culture, but Kant does not teach that duties come from culture, rather he
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teaches that they come from our own rational assessments, and that we give ourselves
universal laws. But if it turns out—as it does—that respectable, intelligent, disciplined
people from different cultures sometimes differ in their moral judgments in ways that
reveal cultural differences, then it follows that Kant is wrong about the origins of duty.
Another approach to the ethics of duty asserts that everyone has a duty to respect
the universal natural rights of individuals. The rights in question here are not the
constitutional and civil rights that arise from positive law. They are not the traditional
rights established by common law and community practice. They are not even the
natural rights that John Locke and the Declaration of Independence claim to be granted
by God. These are the kinds of natural rights asserted in the Declaration of the Rights of
Man in 1789, which depend on nature alone, and not on any decree of God or any
agreement among human beings.
This approach is also problematic for several reasons. First, it imagines the
human person in a peculiarly modern, western, liberal, individualist way. Second, it
asserts peculiarly modern, western, liberal, individualist judgments about human conduct
and human relationships as a norm for all cultures. Third, pretends, as the Kantian
individual pretends, to draw these judgments from the pure exercise of reason, rather than
from the peculiar community in which they were first framed. Consequently, like Kant’s
duties formed according to the categorical imperative, natural rights—these peculiar
natural rights of modern liberal individualism—must be recognized for what they are: the
assertions of their authors.
The second conventional theory of ethics is an ethics of utility. John Stuart Mill,
in his book Utilitarianism, agreed with Kant that morality could not be about the pursuit
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of personal goals and the fulfillment of personal desires. He also agreed that moral
philosophy should enable an individual to determine what was right according to a
rational assessment.
We are not so apt these days to think of Marxism with the same kind of idealism
that colored MacIntyre’s work fifty years ago and there are two reasons for this. The first
has to do with the historical failure of Lenin and Trotsky’s Marxist revolution. The
second is rooted in a theoretical critique of Marxism itself.
Historically, by Trotsky’s account in his book, Revolution Betrayed, the socialist
revolution in the Soviet Union was still in its infancy when Lenin died in 1924. Lenin’s
successor, Joseph Stalin moved to consolidate power around a centralized bureaucratic
apparatus supported by a violent and oppressive police state. This Stalinist form of
government, which Trotsky called “a deformed workers’ state” and “state capitalism,”
became identified with communism in the Soviet Union. And it was this form of
communism that the Soviet Union imposed its satellite states in Eastern Europe when in
the wake of World War II. Historically, professedly Marxist governments did much to
ruin the reputation of Marxism.
Theoretically, Marxism failed to live up to its pretension that it had a scientific
character because its predictions rarely came true. It failed to predict the behavior of
people. It failed to predict the actual history of the revolution. It failed to do these things
because Marxism is a determinist theory; that is, it presupposes that people are not free
when they make rational choices. It also failed because it did not adequately address the
mystery of human selfishness; for the classless society may look interesting on paper, but
anyone who seriously attempts to establish it is only volunteering to be overpowered by
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those who see their effort as an opportunity to establish themselves as the new ruling
class.
By Trotsky’s account, the Soviet revolution had been betrayed by Stalin, and by
Stalinism. It had been betrayed by the formation of a permanent bureaucracy and a
permanent police force. It had been betrayed by Stalin’s abandonment of efforts to
spread the revolution internationally. It had been betrayed by the establishment of party
bureaucrats as a new ruling class in the Soviet Union. It had been betrayed by its
abandonment of the democratic goals of the revolution, and by Stalin’s purges, which had
killed nearly all of the leaders of the October Revolution, drove Trotsky into exile and
imprisoned or exterminated most of Trotsky’s Soviet followers. A Stalinist agent finally
murdered Leon Trotsky in Mexico in 1940.
The criminality of the Stalinist regime began to come to light in the West after
Stalin died in 1953. Three years later, Nakita Kruschev catalogued and condemned
Stalin’s offenses against “the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy” in the
“secret speech” of February 1956, but when Kruschev directed the Soviet suppression of
the Hungarian uprising in October of that year, the result was widespread disillusionment
with Marxism and Stalinism across the world.
By the time MacIntyre rose to prominence in Great Britain in the 1950s, British
Marxists had split into three discernible camps: the British Labour Party, the Communist
Party of Great Britain, and those aligned with neither group. It was from this third group
that the New Left would arise, it included Trotskyist critics of Stalinism, and one of these
Trotskyists was Alasdair MacIntyre.
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For my own great-grandfather, a skilled carpenter who immigrated from Ireland
in 1870 with a chest full of tradesman’s tools, it meant taking a job at a steel mill. So for
him, industrialization was absorbed into the experience of immigration. For communities
in Europe, it meant moving from farms and shops to factory towns and becoming what
Marx called the proletariat. America grew up with industrialization, and this makes the
industrial revolution less visible in American history, but the same could not be said of
Europe.

MacIntyre explained what drew him to Marxism in an interview in the early

1990s:
Liberalism in the name of freedom imposes a certain kind of unacknowledged
domination, and one which in the long run tends to dissolve traditional human ties
and to impoverish social and cultural relationships. Liberalism, while imposing
through state power regimes that declare everyone free do pursue whatever they
take to be their own good, deprives most people of the possibility of
understanding their lives as a quest for the discovery and achievement of the
good, especially by the way in which it attempts to discredit those traditional
forms of human community within which this project has to be embodied.13
MacIntyre was drawn to Marxist theory because of its concern with human progress and
liberation.
Modern professors are often highly knowledgeable specialists in a single field and
unfamiliar with the details of most others, but MacIntyre never saw this as a positive
development; his work spans classical literature, modern thought, contemporary
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literature, and the social sciences, and After Virtue draws from, and contributes to, many
different academic specializations. One consequence of this is that After Virtue has been
read and reviewed by more people in more fields than most contemporary philosophy
books, while many of those readers have been unable to appreciate points in the argument
that lie outside of their own specializations.
A second consequence of academic specialization on the reading of After Virtue
has to do with the book’s place in MacIntyre’s career. After Virtue is MacIntyre’s last
book of fully secular philosophy. His subsequent books would belong squarely to the
literature of Christian, specifically Catholic thought. So MacIntyre’s Christian readers
have read After Virtue without the background of MacIntyre’s earlier work, particularly
his Marxist writings from the 1960s, while secular readers refuse to follow MacIntyre
into what they take to be the occult realm of Catholic literature.
As a result of these two consequences of academic specialization, the early
secondary literature on MacIntyre that developed in response to After Virtue suffered
from a variety of errors. Liberal moral theorists read After Virtue to respond to
MacIntyre’s critique of modern liberal individualism. Bureaucratic Marxist social
theorists read After Virtue to respond to MacIntyre’s critique of what Trotsky had called
“bureaucratism.”14 Aristotelians and Thomists of various kinds, along with contemporary
virtue ethicists, read After Virtue because of the encouragement it gives to the project of
reestablishing an ethics of virtue, although they—including myself—find it necessary to
respond to what they—indeed we—take to be the shortcomings of After Virtue’s account
of virtue. Philosophers of the social sciences, philosophers of management, historians of
14
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philosophy, and many others, specializing in a wide variety of fields also read After
Virtue to respond to MacIntyre’s comments as they pertain to their various
specializations.
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